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This article examines the enforcement of foreign awards in Australia. It identifies and explains the difference
between a “foreign award” and “international arbitration award,” observing it is a somewhat surprising but
potentially significant distinction. The article then moves to consider the consequences of the distinction with
particular reference to the Australian arbitral landscape. Australia has dual arbitration regimes operating at the
state and federal level. Particular attention is given to the still controversial Queensland Supreme Court of
Appeal decision in 
 
Australian Granites Ltd. v. Eisenwerk Hensel Bayreyth Dipl-Ing Burkhardt
GmbH
 
. The article concludes by promoting a line of interpretation that will effectively allow subsequent courts
to avoid the potentially disastrous effects the 
 
Eisenwerk
 
 decision may yet still wreak.
 
I.
 
Introduction
 
Over recent years there has been an increasing awareness in Australia of arbitration
as the preferred method of dispute resolution in international transactions and a growing
push to promote Sydney as an arbitral venue. In light of the growing number of arbitra-
tion clauses being included in international contracts naming Sydney (or other Australian
cities) as the seat for the arbitration of any disputes that do arise, it is important that we
consider how an award handed down in such an arbitration is to be enforced in Australia.
Part II of this article examines the enforcement of foreign awards in Australia. It
identifies and explains the difference between a “foreign award” and “international
arbitration award.” It is a somewhat surprising but potentially significant distinction.
In Part III we then move our consideration to the consequences of the distinction
with particular reference to the Australian arbitral landscape. Australia has dual arbitration
regimes operating at the state and federal level. It is here that the Queensland Supreme
Court of Appeal decision in 
 
Australian Granites Ltd. v. Eisenwerk Hensel Bayreyth Dipl-Ing
Burkhardt GmbH
 
1 could deliver another poison pill to international arbitration in Australia.
The article concludes by promoting a line of interpretation that will effectively allow
subsequent courts to avoid the potentially disastrous effects of the 
 
Eisenwerk
 
 decision.
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II.
 
Enforcement of Foreign Awards in Australia
 
Enforcement of foreign awards is clearly dealt with by Part II of the International
Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (IAA). However, an award handed down in Australia does
not fall within the definition of “
 
foreign award
 
” for the purposes of Part II of the IAA. A
foreign award is defined in section 3 of the IAA as: 
 
an arbitral award made, in pursuance of an arbitration agreement, in a country other than
Australia, being an arbitral award in relation to which the Convention applies.
 
A.
 
Enforcement of “international” domestic awards
 
Thus, if we have an arbitration in Sydney involving a Singaporean entity and an
Australian entity, how does the Singaporean entity enforce any award handed down
against the Australian entity, in Australia, given that the award is not a foreign award for
the purposes of section 8 of the IAA?
The answer appears to be, Chapter VIII of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration (“Model Law”). The Model Law is given force of law
in Australia by section 16 of the IAA. Under Article 1(3) of the Model Law, an arbitration
is “international” if: 
(a) the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of conclusion of that
agreement, their places of business in different States; or
(b) one of the following places is situated outside the State in which the parties
have their places of business: 
(i) the place of arbitration if determined in, or pursuant to, the arbitration
agreement; or
(ii) any place where a substantial part of the obligations of the commercial
relationship is to be performed or the place with which the subject-matter
of the dispute is most closely connected; or
(c) the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration
agreement relates to more than one country.
Whilst every foreign award (as defined in the IAA) would constitute an international
arbitration award (for the purposes of the Model Law), not every international arbitration
award will be foreign. It follows therefore that an arbitration held in Australia can be an
“international” arbitration for the purposes of the Model Law, even though any award
handed down in that arbitration is not a foreign award for the purposes of the IAA.
Section 20 of the IAA states that where, but for that section, both Chapter VIII of
the Model Law and Part II of the IAA would apply in relation to an award, Chapter VIII
of the Model Law does not apply in relation to the award. Simply stated, Part II of the
IAA is the controlling legislation. However, as an award handed down in Australia does
not fall within the definition of “foreign award” for the purposes of Part II of the IAA,
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there is a very strong argument that section 20 of the IAA is therefore not enlivened and
Chapter VIII of the Model law remains operative in relation to the award.
This is supported by the inclusion of section 19 in the IAA, which provides that, for
the avoidance of doubt, if an award is to be enforced under the Model Law, the award is
in conflict with the public policy of Australia if the making of the award was induced by
fraud or corruption or a breach of natural justice occurred in connection with the mak-
ing of the award. Whilst section 19 would appear somewhat redundant, given that one
would expect both of these categories to fall within the public policy exception, the
inclusion of this section in the IAA, expressly contemplating enforcement under the
Model Law, supports the argument that international arbitral awards that fall outside of
the bounds of Part II of the IAA are to be dealt with under Chapter VIII of the Model
Law. If it were not so, section 19 would have no purpose—a position not possible under
Australian law courtesy of the presumption against surplusage.
 
2
 
B.
 
New York Convention
 
Allowing for enforcement of international arbitration awards which are not foreign
is also consistent with Article I of the New York Convention, which states that, in addi-
tion to the Convention applying to the recognition and enforcement of awards made in
another Convention country (that is, a foreign award), the Convention “shall also apply
to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition
and enforcement are sought.”
In the example set out above, the arbitration is clearly an international arbitration for
the purposes of the Model Law, as the Singaporean entity has its place of business in a dif-
ferent country to the Australian entity. Given that the Model Law has force of law in Aus-
tralia, in these circumstances it is difficult to see why the arbitral award should be
considered a domestic award. The definition of “domestic arbitration agreement” in the
uniform Commercial Arbitration Acts further suggests that such an award should not be
considered as domestic. This is elaborated upon below.
C.
 
The U.S. approach
 
This result is consistent with the outcome in the U.S. decision of 
 
Bergesen v. Joseph
Muller.
 
3
 
 There an award handed down in New York pursuant to a dispute between two
foreign parties was held to be non-domestic under the New York Convention.
Bergesen, a Norwegian corporation, and Joseph Muller Corporation, a Swiss cor-
poration, participated in an arbitration in New York. When Bergesen attempted to
 
2
 
‘As was said in Project Blue Sky Inc. v. Australian Broadcasting Authority, “the duty of a court is to give the
words of a statutory provision the meaning that the legislature is taken to have intended them to have. Seldom will a
construction that gives a provision no useful work to do achieve that end.” 
 
See
 
 Plaintiff S157/2002 v. Common-
wealth (2003) 211 C.L.R. 476, 510; 
 
see also
 
 D.C. P
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 R.S. G
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, S
 
tatutory
 
 I
 
nterpretation in
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ustralia
 
35 (4th ed. 1996) (citing a long list of authorities).
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enforce the award, handed down in New York, in the United States, Muller contended
that the New York Convention did not extend to the enforcement of an arbitration award
made in the United States because it was neither a “foreign” award nor an award “not
considered as domestic” within the meaning of the Convention. The Court of Appeal for
the Second Circuit observed: 
 
We adopt the view that awards “not considered as domestic” denotes awards which are subject to
the Convention not because [they were] made abroad, but because [they were] made within the
legal framework of another country, e.g., produced in accordance with foreign law or involving
parties domiciled or having their principal place of business outside the enforcing jurisdiction. We
prefer this broader construction because it is more in line with the intended purposes of the treaty,
which was entered into to encourage the recognition and enforcement of international arbitration
awards. Applying that purpose to this case involving two foreign entitled leads to the conclusion
that this award is not domestic.
 
4
D.
 
Different tests
 
Interestingly, there are slightly different criteria for enforcing an award under the Model
Law and Part II of the IAA. As a result, there may be greater certainty when enforcing
an international award handed down in Australia, as opposed to a foreign award (if one
ignores any doubts created by the 
 
Eisenwerk
 
 decision, which will be discussed further below).
The criteria for enforcement of a foreign award, as laid down in section 8 of the IAA
is as follows: 
(1) Subject to this Part, a foreign award is binding by virtue of this Act for all purposes
on the parties to the arbitration agreement in pursuance of which it was made.
(2) Subject to this Part, a foreign award may be enforced in a court of a State or
Territory as if the award had been made in that State or Territory in accordance
with the law of that State or Territory.
…
(5) Subject to subsection (6), in any proceedings in which the enforcement of a
foreign award by virtue of this Part is sought, the court may, at the request of
the party against whom it is invoked, refuse to enforce the award if that party
proves to the satisfaction of the court that: 
(a) that party, being a party to the arbitration agreement in pursuance of
which the award was made, was, under the law applicable to him, under
some incapacity at the time when the agreement was made;
(b) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law expressed in the
agreement to be applicable to it or, where no law is so expressed to be
applicable, under the law of the country where the award was made;
 
4
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(c) that party was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator
or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his
case in the arbitration proceedings;
(d) the award deals with a difference not contemplated by, or not falling
within the terms of, the submission to arbitration, or contains a decision
on a matter beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration;
(e) the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not
in accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agree-
ment, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbi-
tration took place; or
(f ) the award has not yet become binding on the parties to the arbitration
agreement or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority
of the country in which, or under the law of which, the award was made.
(6) Where an award to which paragraph (5)(d) applies contains decisions on mat-
ters submitted to arbitration and those decisions can be separated from deci-
sions on matters not so submitted, that part of the award which contains
decisions on matters so submitted may be enforced.
(7) In any proceedings in which the enforcement of a foreign award by virtue of
this Part is sought, the court may refuse to enforce the award if it finds that: 
(a) the subject matter of the difference between the parties to the award is
not capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws in force in the
State or Territory in which the court is sitting; or
(b) to enforce the award would be contrary to public policy.
The test laid down for enforcement of an international award in Article 35 of the
Model Law is as follows: 
(1) An arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it was made, shall be
recognized as binding and, upon application in writing to the competent
court, shall be enforced subject to the provisions of this article and of article 36.
The test laid down for refusing to enforce an international award in Article 36 of the
Model Law is as follows: 
(1) Recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award, irrespective of the country in
which it was made, may be refused only: 
(a) at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, if that party fur-
nishes to the competent court where recognition or enforcement is
sought proof that: 
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 was
under some incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid under the
law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or
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(ii) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper
notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral pro-
ceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitra-
tion, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitra-
tion can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the
award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration
may be recognized and enforced; or
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing
such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country
where the arbitration took place; or
(v) the award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set
aside or suspended by a court of the country in which, or under the
law of which, that award was made; or
(b) if the court finds that: 
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of this State; or
(ii) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
the public policy of this State.
As a result of slight textual differences, it is arguable that a court in Australia has a
discretion as to whether to enforce a foreign award, given the adoption of the word
“may” in section 8 of the IAA, rather than the “shall” that appears in the New York Con-
vention and that has been adopted in Article 35(1) of the Model Law.
This is further supported by the exclusion of the word “only” in section 8(5) of the
IAA, which appears in the New York Convention, making it clear that the reasons that
follow for refusing to enforce an award constitute an exclusive list of reasons for refusing
to enforce. Article 36 of the Model Law once again reflects the New York Convention
position and also incorporates the equivalent of section 8(7) of the IAA within the exclu-
sive list of reasons for refusing to enforce an award.
As such, if an international award is to be enforced pursuant to the Model Law
rather than Part II of the IAA, it is arguable that such an award is not subject to the gen-
eral discretion which may apply to foreign awards. This point was discussed by Lee J. in
 
Resort Condominiums Int’l Inc. v. Bolwell and another
 
5
 
 and referred to (without expressing a
concluded view on the existence of a general discretion) by McDougall J. in 
 
Corvetina
Technology Ltd. v. Clough Engineering Ltd
 
.
 
6
 
5
 
Resort Condominiums Int’l Inc. v. Bolwell & another (1993) 118 A.L.R. 655.
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III.
 
Consequences of Distinction
 
A.
 
Opting out of the Model Law: Commercial Arbitration Acts
 
Section 21 of the IAA allows parties to agree that their disputes are to be settled
“otherwise than in accordance with the Model Law.” Given that an award cannot be
enforced pursuant to section 8 of the IAA, where the seat of the arbitration is Australia,
what happens if the parties to such an arbitration have opted out of the Model Law?
If an award falls outside of both the IAA and the Model Law, then it would have to
be enforced pursuant to section 33 of the Commercial Arbitration Act (“CAA”) of the
relevant state or territory. However, absent the framework provided by section 8 of the
IAA or Article 35 of the Model Law, it is arguable that the bases for refusing to enforce a
domestic arbitral award under the CAA would also apply to an international arbitral
award handed down in Australia.
Under section 38 of the CAAs, judicial review on questions of law arising out of an
award is available if the parties consent to the review or by leave of the court. Leave will
only be granted where the court considers that the determination of the question of law
could substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties and there is: 
(a) a manifest error of law on the face of the award; or
(b) strong evidence that the tribunal made an error of law and that determination of
the question may add, or may be likely to add, substantially to the commercial law.
However, such leave is subject to any exclusion agreement under section 40 of the CAA,
which states: 
40 Exclusion agreements affecting rights under sections 38 and 39 
(1) Subject to this section and section 41: 
(a) the Supreme Court shall not, under section 38(4)(b), grant leave to
appeal with respect to a question of law arising out of an award, and
(b) no application may be made under section 39(1)(a) with respect to a
question of law,
if there is in force an agreement in writing (in this section and section 41
referred to as an exclusion agreement) between the parties to the arbitration
agreement which excludes the right of appeal under section 38(2) in relation
to the award or, in a case falling within paragraph (b), in relation to an award
to which the determination of the question of law is material.
(2) An exclusion agreement may be expressed so as to relate to a particular award,
to awards under a particular arbitration agreement or to any other description
of awards, whether arising out of the same arbitration agreement or not.
(3) An agreement may be an exclusion agreement for the purposes of this section
whether it is entered into before or after the commencement of this Act and
whether or not it forms part of an arbitration agreement.
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(4) Except as provided by subsection (1), sections 38 and 39 shall have effect not-
withstanding anything in any agreement purporting: 
(a) to prohibit or restrict access to the Supreme Court, or
(b) to restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
(5) An exclusion agreement shall be of no effect in relation to an award made on,
or a question of law arising in the course of, an arbitration being an arbitration
under any other Act.
(6) An exclusion agreement shall be of no effect in relation to an award made on,
or a question of law arising in the course of, an arbitration under an arbitration
agreement which is a domestic arbitration agreement unless the exclusion
agreement is entered into after the commencement of the arbitration in which
the award is made or, as the case required, in which the question of law arises.
(7) In this section, domestic arbitration agreement means an arbitration agreement
which does not provide, expressly or by implication, for arbitration in a coun-
try other than Australia and to which neither: 
(a) an individual who is a national of, or habitually resident in, any country
other than Australia, nor
(b) a body corporate which is incorporated in, or whose central manage-
ment and control is exercised in, any country other than Australia,
is a party at the time the arbitration agreement is entered into.
The negative language in section 40(7) can be confusing. To clarify, any arbitration
involving a foreign party cannot be a domestic arbitration agreement. Thus, the example
used at the beginning of this article would not be a domestic arbitration agreement
because of the Singaporean party, meaning a pre-existing exclusion clause in the arbitral
rules could be operative.
The most significant Australian authority on exclusion agreements appears to be
 
Raguz v. Sullivan
 
.
 
7
 
 It is apparent from the discussion of exclusion agreements, and relevant
authorities, in Spigelman C.J. and Mason P.’s joint judgment, that an exclusion agreement
may be incorporated by reference to arbitral rules; but it must be more than a mere
agreement that an award will be “final and binding.” This is logical given that section 28
of the CAAs provides that an award will be final and binding in any event. In 
 
Raguz v.
Sullivan
 
, it was held that the agreement that neither party to the arbitration would 
 
“insti-
tute or maintain proceedings in any court”
 
 encompassed an appeal to the NSW Supreme
Court under section 38(2) and was therefore an exclusion agreement for the purposes of
section 40.
 
8
 
As is noted above, section 38 of the CAAs only permits judicial review if the parties
consent to the review or by leave of the court.
 
7
 
(2000) 50 N.S.W.L.R. 236.
 
8
 
Id
 
. at 253–54.
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B.
 
Danger of 
 
E
 
ISENWERK
 
The possibility of obtaining leave under section 38 of the CAAs compared to the
general position in international arbitration where there is no right to review and revise
the merits of an award is an issue that must be considered where parties agree to arbitrate
in Australia and intend to opt out of the Model Law (and thus recourse to section 8 of
the IAA is unavailable). Furthermore, the Queensland Supreme Court decision in 
 
Aus-
tralian Granites Ltd. v. Eisenwerk Hensel Bayreyth Dipl-Ing Burkhardt GmbH
 
 highlights a real
danger that parties may be construed to have opted out of the Model Law by adopting
certain arbitral rules, thereby exposing their awards to the possibility of review under sec-
tion 38 of the CAAs. In that case, it was held that the parties had opted out of the Model
Law by adopting the ICC Rules. In 
 
Eisenwerk
 
, Pincus J.A. stated that: 
 
It would have made little sense to agree to subject disputes to arbitration under both the Model
Law and the ICC Rules, since the two are irreconcilable in a number of respects. For example,
the provisions concerning the number and identity of the arbitrators are quite different: see as to
the Model Law, Article 10 and s18 of the Act, and as to ICC arbitration, Articles 1 and 8 of the
1988 Rules.
 
9
The rationale adopted by the court in 
 
Eisenwerk
 
 was then followed in two Singapo-
rean cases, 
 
John Holland Ltd v. Toyo Engineering Ltd
 
10 and 
 
Dermajaya Properties Sdn Bhd v.
Premium Properties Sdn Bhd.
 
11
 
 The Singaporean government moved quickly to statutorily
overcome the effect of these decisions, however, there has been no such Australian action.
Consequently, 
 
Eisenwerk
 
 is still there to be followed.
Assuming that 
 
Eisenwerk
 
 was followed, it would be necessary to consider the arbitral
rules chosen by the parties to determine whether, to the extent the Model Law may be
said to have been excluded, an exclusionary agreement could be found.
The most likely set of rules to be used in the context of an arbitration with an Aus-
tralian city as seat are the Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration
(ACICA) Rules. The problem will not arise where the ACICA Rules have been used, as
although Article 33.2 merely states that the award is final and binding, Article 2.3 specif-
ically states “[by] selecting these Rules the parties do not intend to exclude the operation
of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,” an article
drafted with the 
 
Eisenwerk
 
 decision in mind.
However, the same cannot be said of other popular international arbitral rules and
an analysis is enlightening:
Article 31(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules; Article 32(2) of the Swiss Rules; Hong Kong
International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) arbitrations and Kuala Lumpur Regional
Centre for Arbitration (KLRCA) arbitrations: 
 
The award shall be made in writing and shall be final and binding on the parties. The parties
undertake to carry out the award without delay.
 
9
 
Supra
 
 note 1, para. 10.
 
10
 
[2001] 2 S.L.R. 262.
 
11
 
[2002] S.L.R. 164.
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Article 27.8 of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) Rules: 
 
By agreeing to have an arbitration under these Rules, the parties undertake to carry out the award
without delay. Awards shall be final and binding on the parties from the date they are made.
 
HKIAC and KLRCA administered arbitrations have been included here as both
centres promote the use of the UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules. The Swiss Rules are
based on the UNCITRAL Rules and do not depart from them in this respect. It would
seem very likely, applying the reasoning in 
 
Raguz v. Sullivan
 
, that neither the UNCI-
TRAL rule nor the SIAC rule would amount to an exclusionary agreement, thus poten-
tially opening an award to significantly greater challenge than the parties may have
intended.
Article 28(6) of the ICC Rules: 
 
Every Award shall be binding upon the parties. By submitting the dispute to arbitration under
these Rules, the parties undertake to carry out any Award without delay and shall be deemed to
have waived their right to any form of recourse insofar as such waiver can validly be made.
 
Article 26.9 of the LCIA Rules: 
 
All awards shall be final and binding on the parties. By agreeing to arbitration under these Rules,
the parties undertake to carry out any award immediately and without any delay (subject to Article
27); and the parties also waive irrevocably their right to any form of appeal, review or recourse to
any state court or other judicial authority, insofar as such waiver may be validly made.
 
Both the ICC Rules and the LCIA Rules go beyond a mere reference to “final and
binding” and are likely to be considered exclusionary agreements for the purposes of sec-
tions 38 and 39 CAA. Of these, the LCIA rule is the most explicit.
C.
 
Why 
 
E
 
ISENWERK
 
 should not be followed
 
With respect, we would submit that the proposition outlined by Pincus J.A. in
 
Eisenwerk
 
 is incorrect and that the Model Law and ICC Rules (as an example) are cer-
tainly reconcilable. However, beyond this we suggest that there is a better interpretation
that can be placed on section 21 of the IAA, such that it would not give rise to this issue.
The reasoning adopted in 
 
Eisenwerk
 
 tends to suggest the view that section 21 is an “all or
nothing” opt out provision, that is, either the parties agree to Model Law arbitration or
they abandon it in its entirely. In our submission the better view is that section 21 permits
the parties to opt out of any degree of the Model Law arbitration as they see fit. The
Model Law acts as the default in the absence of clear party intent to the contrary. Thus,
a decision to use a set of arbitral rules is only a decision to opt out of the Model Law to
the extent that the rules are inconsistent.
The basis for this submission is twofold. First, the Model Law contains many provi-
sions which are procedural in nature and beyond the ambit of most (if not all) current sets
of international arbitration rules. In short, it has a very different and additional function
that cannot be provided by party-chosen arbitral rules. Of crucial importance here is the
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distinction between procedural rules and procedural law (otherwise known as the 
 
lex arbi-
trii
 
). Secondly, although not clearly identified within the text of the Model Law itself, the
Model Law does contain mandatory provisions. It is only when parties choose rules con-
trary to a mandatory provision that they should be understood as intending to exclude
the Model Law in its entirety. Both of these points warrant further explanation.
The procedural provisions of the Model Law, as with the procedural provisions of
the arbitration legislation of all countries, simply provide a framework for the conduct of
an arbitration and are drafted in a permissive manner, that is, they provide a specified
position on certain procedural issues should the parties fail to agree otherwise. Article 2
of the Model Law makes it quite clear that the parties to an arbitration agreement can
authorize a third party, such as ACICA or the LCIA, to determine the issue and that
if the parties agree to conduct their arbitration in accordance with a particular set of
arbitration rules, such as the UNCITRAL Rules, then the position adopted on the
procedural issues in such rules will constitute the parties agreement on such matters.
Article 2 of the Model Law states: 
 
For the purposes of this Law: 
… 
(d) where a provision of this Law, except article 28, leaves the parties free to determine a certain
issue, such freedom includes the right of the parties to authorize a third party, including an
institution, to make that determination;
(e) where a provision of this Law refers to the fact that the parties have agreed or that they may
agree or in any other way refers to an agreement of the parties, such agreement includes any
arbitration rules referred to in that agreement;
 
The Model Law, however, also deals with matters that parties have no legal authority
to simply agree upon. These are in essence matters of law, the authority for which is tra-
ditionally accepted to be a grant of sovereign power. For example, just because two par-
ties might nominate a particular domestic court to determine their dispute, this will not,
in and of itself, mean that that court has the necessary power. The parties are merely 
 
select-
ing
 
 a court, they are not providing it with a grant of jurisdiction—only a parliament exer-
cising a sovereign power can do that. This is an important difference to the situation of
an arbitral tribunal, which does derive its power from the will of the parties.
A good example of this point can be found in Article 12(1) of the Model Law. This
article places an obligation on the arbitrator and not on either of the parties to the arbi-
tration agreement as such. It is therefore not something the parties could contract out of
in the first place.
The second basis for the proposed interpretation of section 21 IAA is that the Model
Law contains mandatory provisions. Despite early proposals to do so, the Model Law
does not contain a list of mandatory provisions.
 
12
 
 However, “the prevailing view, adopted
 
12
 
See
 
 the Report of the Working Group on its seventh session, para. 176, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9/246 (March 6,
1984), where it is noted that the Working Group agreed that an article listing mandatory provisions should not be
included, despite its appearance in earlier drafts.
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by the UNCITRAL Working Group, was that it was desirable to express the non-
mandatory character in all provisions of the final text which were intended to be non-
mandatory.”
 
13
 
 By implication, therefore, one could assume that unless an article of the
Model Law contains the phrase “unless agreed otherwise by the parties” or something
similar then the article will be mandatory. This would be a dangerous assumption and
making a determination on that basis alone would be unwise.
The issue is certainly a difficult one, as can be evidenced by the significant deliber-
ations of the UNCITRAL Working Group on this topic alone. In our view the best test
of whether a provision is mandatory or not is to ask: “If this provision is altered will it in
some way affect a fundamental and innate quality of arbitration?”
A benefit of the proposed test is that it allows for degrees of autonomy or varying
flexibility within the actual articles of the Model Law. It may be possible to vary some
otherwise mandatory articles in such a way as to preserve the fundamental or innate
nature of arbitration. An example of this can be found in Article 11(4) and is indeed con-
templated by that article. The feature of the article that is mandatory is the need for a
process to prevent one party stalling or frustrating the arbitration. The article provides for
recourse to the courts if necessary but also notes that the parties may have determined an
alternative procedure that achieves the same result.
On the basis of the proposed test and in the Australian context it is suggested the fol-
lowing Model Law provisions are mandatory.
1.
 
Article 8(1)
 
Article 8(1) of the Model Law imposes a mandatory stay of court proceedings where
there is a valid arbitration agreement. Applying the test proposed above, an innate aspect
of arbitration is that it is intended to be a final and binding solution. Parties should not
be permitted to renege on their initial intentions. It is, of course, possible that both par-
ties decide the matter is best dealt with by the courts and pursue their dispute in that
forum. This prospect does not affect the mandatory nature of Article 8. In that situation
the arbitration agreement will have been abandoned and is therefore no longer operative,
a possibility contemplated by Article 8 itself.
2.
 
Article 11(4) and (5)
 
As noted above, Article 11(4) is a mandatory article in so far as the purpose is to
ensure the arbitration proceeds, and cannot be frustrated by a now unwilling participant.
Article 11(5) contains the mandatory requirement that arbitrators be impartial and inde-
pendent. These can be seen to be fundamental to the prospect of the parties receiving
equal treatment and a fair hearing, both essential characteristics of an arbitration.
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3.
 
Article 18
 
Article 18 can be described as a true cornerstone of arbitration: “The parties shall be
treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting [its]
case.”
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4.
 
Article 24(4)
 
This article is simply an extension of the principle outlined in Article 18. Without
due notice a party will not be in a position to properly present its case.
5.
 
Article 27
 
Article 27 allows a tribunal recourse to the assistance of a local court for the purpose
of taking evidence. This article is considered mandatory under the test suggested above,
as the taking of evidence is a fundamental feature of arbitration. The tribunal itself will
not have the infrastructure for enforcing compliance with evidentiary orders, and so must
be entitled to rely on the domestic courts.
None of the popular international sets of arbitral rules analysed above
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 (or others that
these authors are aware of ) fall foul of any of these provisions. Accordingly, in the absence
of other evidence a choice by parties to an arbitration agreement to ultilize any of these
rules should not be seen as a decision to depart from the Model Law in its entirety.
IV.
 
Conclusion
 
This article has sought to identify and explain a potential issue in arbitration in Aus-
tralia. It is not a fatal issue and it is hoped that with awareness will come avoidance of any
uncertainty. By this we do not mean that parties should avoid arbitrating in Australia, to
the contrary we are both strongly of the view that Australian cities are wonderful seats of
arbitration. However, it is prudent that parties ensure that they do not unintentionally opt
out of the Model Law in full (a potential outcome until 
 
Eisenwerk
 
 is revisited and over-
turned) and that they further ensure they have entered an exclusionary agreement for the
purposes of the CAAs, if they do opt out of the Model Law.
There is good reason to believe that issues such as this one are being addressed and
resolved at a law making level. Although not specifically on point, cases like 
 
Administration
of Norfolk Island v. SMEC Australia Pty Ltd
 
.,
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 and 
 
Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd. v. Transfield
Pty Ltd. & Obayashi Corp.,17 have all demonstrated a judicial willingness to interpret a
14 Model Law, art. 18.
15 The rules analysed were the ACICA Rules, the UNCITRAL Rules, the Swiss Rules, the SIAC Rules, the
ICC Rules, and the LCIA Rules.
16 [2004] N.F.S.C. 1.
17 Supreme Court of Victoria, October 16, 1998, unreported.
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reference to state law as not being an opt out decision pursuant to section 21 of the IAA.
In our submission, the issue of a conflicting law would be a far greater one than a not
otherwise inconsistent rule.
Futhermore, considerable encouragement for international arbitration in Australia
generally can be drawn from statements such as those made by Allsop J. in the very recent
Full Federal Court decision of Comandate Marine Corp. v. Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd.:18
However, to the extent that The “Kiukiang Career”, … can be seen to be authority, albeit obiter,
for the proposition that the phrase “arising out of” cannot include a claim based on pre-contract
representations and that the phrase should not be analysed (subject to any particular factual aspect
of the case) … then I am persuaded that it is wrong and inconsistent with the approach of modern
authority to which I have referred. Because of the importance of the issue to commerce in this country, my
view is that I should not merely expose my disagreement, but should take the step so far as it is up to me to
bring the views of this Court into conformity with the Court of Appeal of New South Wales and other deci-
sions of courts in Australia and elsewhere concerning the approach to the construction of arbitration clauses. So,
to the extent that the reasoning in The “Kuikiang Career” is inconsistent with that set out above, I
am persuaded that it is wrong and should be departed from.19
18 [2006] F.C.A.F.C. 192 (December 20, 2006).
19 Id. para. 184 (emphasis added).
